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NUCLEAR WASTE-THE CASE FOR
CONFIDENCE IN DISPOSAL
OMER
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I. INTRODUCTION

As reflected in this Symposium, the public debate about the
acceptability of nuclear power has concentrated in the last few
years largely on radioactive waste management. In 1979, the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission
or NRC) commenced a rulemaking proceeding to review: (1) its
degree of confidence in what will be the disposition of spent nuclear fuel' stored at the sites of operating commercial power reactors, and, (2) how questions about such disposition should be
addressed in individual NRC licensing proceedings. 2 The proceeding has come to be known as the "Waste Confidence
EDITOR'S NOTE: The views expressed in this Article are not necessarily those of
the U.S. Department of Energy, but are the views of the authors. Portions of the Article
are drawn substantially, however, from position statements prepared for the Department
of Energy. In the interest of clarity, citations to the statements have been omitted where
they would serve no beneficial purpose.
* Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy; A.B., Rutgers University, 1969; J.D.,
Cornell University, 1972.
** Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy; B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1967; J.D.,
University of Wyoming, 1976.
1. "Spent nuclear fuel" is fuel that has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor to the
point that it no longer contributes to the nuclear chain reaction and must be replaced.
The basic component of the fuel for a nuclear power plant is a pellet of uranium oxide
about the size of a pencil eraser. Pellets are loaded into 12 to 13-foot-long zircalloy tubes,
which are sealed and bundled together into fuel assemblies-each containing between 50
and 270 tubes. Spent nuclear fuel typically is removed from a power reactor at approximately annual intervals (depending upon a number of variables including the plant's
capacity factor) and replaced by fresh fuel. About one-fourth to one-third of the fuel
assemblies in the core are removed and replaced. For a typical 1000-megawatt reactor,
this amounts to about 27 to 31 tonnes (metric tons) of fuel, or 65 to 180 fuel assemblies
per year. When spent nuclear fuel leaves the reactor and is transferred to on-site storage
pools, it is thermally hot and highly radioactive. Much of the heat and radiation decay
away after about 5 years. The spent fuel, however, remains potentially dangerous over
much longer periods of time.
2. See Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 (1979).
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Rulemaking." The rulemaking, which still is underway, has provided a major public forum on waste management. It has given
both proponents and opponents of the nuclear option an opportunity to present their views on the adequacy of our country's
high-level nuclear wastes policy. An enormous record already has
been amassed.4 The outcome of this proceeding could have an
important impact on the contribution nuclear power will make
to our future energy needs and on the public's perception of its
relative costs and benefits to society.
This Article presents the case for "confidence" in the ability
to dispose of high-level nuclear waste in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner, as presented in the Waste Confidence
Rulemaking by the United States Department of Energy (the
Department or DOE). First, it would be helpful to review the
background and scope of the proceeding itself.
A. Background and Scope of the Rulemaking
The Commission has defined the scope of the Waste Confidence Rulemaking as follows:
The purpose of this proceeding is solely to assess generically the degree of assurance now available that radioactive
waste can be safely disposed of, to determine when such disposal or off-site storage will be available, and to determine
whether radioactive wastes can be safely stored on-site past the
expiration of existing facility licenses until off-site disposal or
storage is available.3
The rulemaking was initiated by the Commission in response to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Minnesota v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.e It also is a continuation of previous
proceedings conducted by the Commission to evaluate its confi3. "High-level nuclear waste" is spent nuclear fuel, if disposed of, or the aqueous
solution from the first-cycle solvent extraction, in which spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed
for recycling of uranium and plutonium. Spent nuclear fuel is the representative waste
form being considered in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking. See text accompanying
notes 17-19 infra.
4. The record now consists of statements of position, cross-statements, suggestions
as to further proceedings, the NRC staff working group report and comments thereon,
and hundreds of supporting references. See note 20 and accompanying text, infra.
5. 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 (1979).
6, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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dence concerning the availability when needed
of safe methods
7
for disposal of high-level nuclear wastes.
On May 23, 1979, the Court of Appeals in Minnesota remanded two commercial licensing actions 8 to the Commission to
consider whether an off-site storage solution for commercial
high-level nuclear wastes will be available by the expiration
dates of the operating licenses of the Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island nuclear power plants. The Commission had granted
permits to increase on-site spent fuel storage facilities at these
plants. The court directed the Commission to consider in the alternative whether spent fuel can be stored at the plant sites past
those dates and until an off-site solution is available. The court
did not set aside or stay the challenged license amendments, an
action which would have effectively shut down the plants.9 The
court agreed with the NRC that it could properly consider the
complex issue of nuclear waste disposal in a "generic" proceeding, such as a rulemaking, and then apply its determination in
subsequent adjudicatory proceedings. 10 The court had no problem rejecting a hypothesized need for individualized determinations since the central issue posed by those challenging the
license amendments-the feasibility of interim or ultimate nuclear waste disposal solutions-is essentially common to all nuclear facilities. 11 The court specifically declined to dictate the
procedures for the NRC's "generic" proceeding.
On October 25, 1979, the Commission commenced the proceeding by issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which provided for a hybrid, legislative-type rulemaking.1 2 More than
7. See 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 (1979). In 1977, the Natural Resources Defense
Council requested that the NRC conduct a rulemaking to determine whether high-level
radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants can be disposed of safely. 42 Fed.
Reg. 34391 (1977), petition for review dismissed sub nom., Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978). As a participant in
the Waste Confidence Rulemaking, the NRDC has been given the opportunity to present
its views on waste disposal that it sought in its 1977 petition.
8. 602 F.2d at 420.
9. Id. at 418.
10. Id. at 417.
11. Id.
12. 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 (1979). The notice provided that the Commission would compile a full bibliography on relevant subjects and make it available to the public at an
early stage of the proceeding. The notice also indicated that written statements of position would be the participants' principal contribution to the rulemaking and that participants should focus their preparation on them. The Commission said the initial state-
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fifty-five entities filed notices of intent to be full participants in

the rulemaking. These included the Department of Energy as
well as agencies of twenty states, electric utilities, environmental
groups, professional societies, and a few individuals.
On January 29, 1980, a prehearing conference was held by

the presiding officer appointed by the Commission to monitor
the early stages of the proceeding and to assist the Commission
in conducting the later portions.13 It was attended by most participants and NRC staff representatives. 1 ' Following the conference, the presiding officer issued an order providing that DOE
would file its statement of position first, that the other participants would file theirs next, and that all participants then would
file cross-statements. 15 Subsequently, all participants would submit their written suggestions about further proceedings, additional areas of inquiry, or further data or studies. A second prehearing order setting out the procedures for the remainder of
the proceeding would follow.16

ments should set forth the participants' views and the underlying assumptions, both
technical and institutional, for those views. The notice provided that written cross-statements limited to material discussed in the initial statements would be submitted next.
The possibility of oral presentations later was left open, and the Commission reserved
the option of providing a final stage at which representatives of the participants might
be cross-examined by other participants upon a demonstration that cross-examination is
necessary to prepare a record adequate for a sound decision. See id.
13. Waste Confidence Rulemaking, Prehearing Conference Transcript at 1-162 (January 29, 1980).
14. The NRC commissioners later issued a memorandum and order defining the role
of the NRC staff in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking following their receipt of two
motions from participants requesting that the NRC staff be assigned an explicit role to
assure the development of an adequate record in the proceeding. Waste Confidence
Rulemaking, Memorandum and Order (May 23, 1980). The commissioners' order directed the NRC's Office of Policy Evaluation to form a "working group" to advise the
Commission regarding the adequacy of the record to be compiled. The working group is
composed of personnel from the NRC Offices of Policy Evaluatin, the General Counsel,
and the executive legal director and is provided with technical support by the NRC program offices of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, Research, and Standards Development. Id.
15. Waste Confidence Rulemaking, First Prehearing Conference Order (February 1,
1980). Because it was filed first, the DOE statement served as a focus-some would say
"target"-for the other participants' statements. The other participants had more than
two and one-half months to analyze and comment upon DOE's statement before theirs
were due on July 7, 1980.
16. Before a second prehearing order could be issued, the Commission directed the
working group to prepare "a report which summarizes the record, identifies key issues
and controversies, and indicates insofar as possible at this stage of the proceeding how
their resolution could affect the Commission's decision." Waste Confidence Rulemaking,
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The presiding officer's first prehearing order contained an
important definition of the scope of the rulemaking. He ruled
that the proceeding would consider, as the representative case
for handling high-level nuclear wastes, disposal and storage of
spent nuclear fuel taken directly from commercial power reactors

This was appropriate in view of the fact that the Commis-

sion in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking needs to determine
whether there is reasonable assurance only that spent fuel in
some form can be safely stored and disposed of by any single
method. This approach also was consistent with the previous
suspension by the Commission of further consideration of
reprocessing of spent fuel from commercial reactors 8 following
the decision of President Carter on April 7, 1977, to defer indefinitely all civilian reprocessing of spent fuel. At the same time, in
presenting its assessment of confidence in the ability to store
and dispose of spent fuel, the Department noted that it was not
suggesting a judgment of the potential suitability or nonsuitability of other techniques such
as reprocessing and solidifi1
cation of resultant nuclear wastes. 9
The Department's statement of position of about 700 pages
was filed and served on each participant on April 15, 1980.20
Thirty-one statements of position, which ranged in length from
one to more than 450 pages, were submitted by the other participants. Cross-statements of all participants (including DOE)
were due by September 5, 1980; twenty-one were filed. Sixteen
suggestions concerning further proceedings subsequently were
fied in October 1980. The NRC Staff Working Group submitted
its report on January 29, 1981. Comments on this report were
Memorandum and Order (January 16, 1981). The working group was instructed not to
make recommendations or express views regarding the conclusions that the Commission
should reach on these issues. Id.

17. The presiding officer also ordered that issues of low-level radioactive waste, uranium mill tailings, and the safety of transportation of waste materials were not within
the proceeding's scope. See Order, supra note 15, at 11.
18. See 42 Fed. Reg. 65334 (1977).
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING
ON THE STORAGE AND DIsPosAL OF NucLEAR WAsTE at 1-2 (April 15, 1980)(hereinafter
cited as DOE STATEM NT OF POSMON).
20. Additionally, the Department, by letter dated January 18, 1980, had submitted
to the Commission a computer list of approximately 11,922 references and abstracts on
waste storage and disposal. The Department also forwarded to the Commission copies of
hundreds of the references cited by the Department for the use of the Commission and
for placement in the Commission's Public Document Room in Washington, D.C.
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due by March 5, 1981; nineteen sets were filed.2 1
22
B. Department of Energy Authority and Experience

It was appropriate for the Department of Energy to agree to
submit its initial statement in advance of the other participants
in the rulemaking because the Department has the statutory
mandate and lead responsibility to conduct research for the federal government concerning nuclear waste management and the
ultimate disposal of certain nuclear materials.2" The role of the
Department as the lead agency for the management and disposal
of radioactive wastes was reiterated by the President in a message to Congress on February 12, 1980.24 Pursuant to this responsibility, the Department is conducting the National Waste
Terminal Storage (NWTS) Program for the disposal of radioactive waste, including methods to isolate such waste and to identify appropriate sites for disposal facilities.2 5
The Department and its predecessor agencies have been involved in the management of radioactive waste since 1944 when
radioactive waste was first generated as a byproduct of national
defense programs.2 6 The principal source of this waste has been
the reprocessing of reactor fuel to recover fissionable materials
for use in the nation's defense program. Radioactive waste also

has resulted from the production of components for weapons,
laboratory experiments, and reactor operations. 27
21. The NRC Commissioners directed that, following submission of these comments, the presiding officer should forward them to the Commissioners along with his
recommendations concerning further proceedings. Waste Confidence Rulemaking, Memorandum and Order (January 16, 1981). In light of this directive, DOE renewed its request of October 6, 1980, that the participants be given an opportunity to submit written
comments on any proposed procedures for further submissions or oral presentations
before the Commission closes the record in the rulemaking. U.S. DEP'T OF ENEROY, COMMENTS ON REPORT OF NucLE R R GULATORY COMMISSION STAFF WORKING GROUP (1981).

22. For a discussion of the statutory basis for federal regulation of nuclear waste, see
Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear Waste, 32
S.C.L. REv. 789, 791-801 (1981).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2052 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7133 (Supp. H 1978).
24. President's Message to Congress on a Radioactive Waste Management Program,
16 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 296 (Feb. 12, 1980).
25. See note 62 infra.
26. For a historical overview of federal regulations of nuclear waste, see Hart, A
Failure to Enact:A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legislation Considered by
the Ninety-Sixth Congress, 32 S.C.L. Rnv. 639, 658-77 (1981).
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NucLEAR WAsTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY
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In the years since 1944, the Department and its predecessor
agencies have accumulated thousands of man-years of experience in managing radioactive waste at various sites around the
country. During this time, active health and safety programs
have been maintained to reduce industrial and radiological accidents to remarkably low levels. Accidents and releases of radioactive materials have occurred, but there have been no injuries
to members of the public or serious environmental damage as a
result of these operations.
C.

The Standardfor Determining "Confidence"

Throughout its statement of position and cross-statement,
the Department argued that it has a nuclear waste management
program capable of handling, storing, and disposing of spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors. The initial statements of some participants discussed the degree of proof the
Commission should apply in making this generic assessment.
The Department noted in its cross-statement that the Commission previously indicated that any final rule resulting from the
proceeding will have to be based upon a finding of "reasonable
assurance" that the facts underlying that rule are true. In the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking announcing the proceeding, the
Commission said:
If the Commission finds reasonable assurance that safe,
off-site disposal for radioactive wastes from licensed facilities
will be available prior to expiration of the facilities' licenses, it
will promulgate a final rule providing that the environmental
and safety implications of continued on-site storage after the
termination of licenses need not be considered in individual i28
censing proceedings.
The Department took the position that it is appropriate
that the Commission apply the "reasonable assurance" standard
in the proceeding and that suggestions by a few participants
that the Commission should apply a different standard should
be rejected. 29 The rulemaking, it was recalled, was initiated by

DocuMENT FY 1981 at 111-3 (1980).
28. 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 (1979) (emphasis added).
29. The NRC staff working group listed the standard for finding confidence as one
of the major issues in the proceeding. DOE has taken the position that this matter
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the Commission in response to the decision of the District of
Columbia Circuit in Minnesota.30 Although the court specifically
declined to dictate the procedures to be followed in this proceeding, 31 it did say that "[t]he breadth of the question involved
and the fact that the ultimate determination can never rise
above a prediction suggest that the determination may be a
kind of legislative judgment for which rulemaking would
suffice." 32
Additional guidance on the standard to be applied by the
Commission was provided by Judge Tamm's concurring opinion
in the same case. "Specifically, there must be a determination
whether it is reasonablyprobable that an off-site fuel repository
will be available when the operating license of the nuclear plant
in question expires." 33 Judge Tamm added:
Our opinion merely remands this case to the Commission for
such proceedings as it deems appropriate to determine whether
there is reasonable assurance that an offsite storage solution
will be available when needed-in this case, by the years 20072009.34
Some other participants apparently agree that the Commission should use the standard of "reasonable assurance" as the
basis for a finding of "confidence" in the safe and timely implementation of proposed disposal and storage programs. 3 5 However, full agreement among the participants as to what constitutes "reasonable assurance" in the context of the rulemaking
does not exist. For example, one participant suggested the need
for an "extraordinarily high degree of assurance,"3 6 while an-

should not be treated as an open issue in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking.
30. 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
31. Id. at 417.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 419 (emphasis added) (Tamm, J., concurring).
34. Id, at 420.
35. See, e.g., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NucLEAR POLLUTION, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DIsposAL oF NucLEAR WAsTE at 913 (July 7, 1980); UTILITY NucLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT GROuP-EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PRoPosED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DIsPOsAL

1-2 (July 7, 1980); OCEAN CouNTY AND TOWNSHIP OF
LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE
OF NUCLEAR WASTE, Document 2 at
STORAGE

AND

DIsPosAL OF NUCLEAR WAsTE at 5 (July 10, 1980).

36.

ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR PoWER, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DIsPOsAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE at 3 (July 1980).
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other suggested that the Commission must have "the highest degree of confidence.

'3 7

The Department has argued that the latter

suggestions go beyond the "reasonable assurance" standard and
that findings should be based upon sound judgment, but not
extraordinary or absolute certainty.
Use of the "reasonable assurance" standard proposed by the
Commission will ensure compliance with the "substantial evidence" standard, the standard established by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) for rulemaking proceedings. 8 Thus, it is a
proper exercise of the Commission's discretion to formulate procedures for making substantive judgments in rulemaking proceedings both because it is in compliance with the APA and because the courts previously have upheld Commission decisions
based upon it.39
One participant argued that the Commission should vote for
no confidence if the weight of evidence tips only slightly toward
confidence. 40 Adopting this suggestion effectively would require
the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" used in criminal
prosecutions. The requirement, the Department said, would be
inappropriate in an NRC rulemaking. Neither the Atomic Energy Act of 195441 nor the Commission regulations 42 require totally risk-free actions.43 Requirement of absolutely risk-free actions would be similar to other absolute positions and arguments
that have been rejected by the courts. 4
The Department has said the Commission also should reject
suggestions that a finding of "confidence" requires extrasensory
perception, as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
and another participant intimated. NRDC argued that to say

37. STATE OF NEw YORK, STATEMENT OF POSION ON PRoPosED RULEMAKING ON THE
STORAGE AND DIsposAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE at 26-27 (July 7, 1980) (hereinafter cited as
STATE OF NEW YORK, STATEMENT OF POSITON).

38. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
39. See, e.g., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 1978); North Anna Envt'l Coalition v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 533 F.2d 655, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
40. STATE OF NEW YORK, STATEMENT OF POSION, supra note 37, at 40-41.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
42. 10 C.F.R. §§ 0.735-1 to 170.41 (1980).
43. See Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954-55 (D.D.C. 1973).
44. See North Anna Envt'l Coalition v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 533 F.2d 655
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
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that safe storage will occur "requires clairvoyance, with which
neither the DOE nor the NRC is equipped." 5 The other participant expressed a concern that various institutional problems
render any attempt to forecast the date for the operation of the
system, which it admits is technically feasible, "to be little more
than an attempt at clairvoyance without the benefit of a crystal
ball.' 4 The Department countered that it is absurd to suggest
that the Commission cannot find confidence in the safe and
timely implementation of proposed disposal and storage programs unless it is endowed with superhuman powers. If such a
standard were required to be the basis for administrative actions, no decisions could be reached or actions taken.
The Department's position has been that the Commission
must base a finding of confidence on an informed, but mortal
prediction of germane technical and program matters. The effectiveness of long-term disposal, unlike the effectiveness of other
industrial activities, such as novel power generation techniques,
cannot be demonstrated to the degree some have suggested. As
another participant pointed out, such demonstration would require observation of the repository over the time period during
which wastes remain hazardous. 1 Obviously, means other than
observations over hundreds or thousands of years must be used
to evaluate the safety of proposed disposal systems.
Another participant argued that the Commission must establish criteria to govern the degree of assurance required for a
finding of "reasonable assurance.' 8 The Department reiterated
its position that the high-level waste disposal system objectives
proposed in its initial statement " provide an appropriate basis
for assessing in the proceeding the technical adequacy of the De-

45.

NATURAL RESOURcES DEFENSE COUNcIL, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED

RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NucLEAR WASTE at 93 (July 7, 1980)
(hereinafter cited as NRDC STATEMENT OF PoSmoN).

46. STATE OF OHIO, STATEMENT OF POSIION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NucLEAR WASTE at 3 (July 7, 1980).
47. See Urirry NucLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT GROUP-EDIsON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF
NUCLEAR WASTE, Document 3 at 1-3 (July 7, 1980).
48. NEw ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON
PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE at 9-13 (July
7, 1980).
49. DOE STATEMENT OF POSITION, supranote 19, at 11-3 to -21. See text accompanying notes 64-66, infra.
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partment's disposal program and of the systems that will result
from its implementation. By contrast, the Commission can measure its confidence in the safety of interim storage on the basis
of existing NRC regulations.50 With respect to assessing DOE
program plans, which requires predicting the future course of
human activities, the Department indicated the Commission
should determine whether acceptable measures will be taken on
a timely basis. Findings of confidence in each of these matters
should be made by the Commission when there is "reasonable
assurance" in favor of such finding.
One participant alleged that the Department's program
does not meet the standards established by the Commission 1
for the issuance of either an operating license or a construction
permit for a power plant and, therefore, the Commission should
not find confidence in the program. This allegation mischaracterized the issue before the Commission in this generic
rulemaking. The Department is not applying in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking for authority to construct or operate a particular disposal or storage facility. The Commission is conducting the proceeding to make a generic judgment that is
largely legislative in nature.
In making its findings in the proceeding, the Department
cautioned the Commission to be careful to avoid devoting undue
attention to sweeping and unsupported contentions about critical "gaps" in technical knowledge or allegations that program
difficulties never will be overcome. Unsupported allegations
should not give rise to presumptions. It was noted that the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NaturalResources Defense Counci 52 indicated that it is incumbent upon
participants in administrative proceedings "to structure their
participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency
to the [participant's] position and contentions," 53 especially
when they are requesting the agency to embark on an explora-

50. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-73.80 (1980) (providing licensing requirements for at-reac-

tor storage). Additionally, on November 12, 1980, the NRC added 10 C.F.R. part 72 to its
regulations to cover the specific licensing requirements for the storage of spent fuel in an
independent spent fuel storage installation. 45 Fed. Reg. 74693 (1980).
51. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a) (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(a)
(1980).
52. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
53. Id. at 553.
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tion of unchartered territory.
II. SUMMARY OF THE DOE POSITION
Throughout the proceeding, the Department has taken the
position that (1) spent nuclear fuel from licensed facilities ultimately can be disposed of safely off-site; (2) disposal facilities
will be in operation between 1997 and 2006; and (3) spent nuclear fuel from licensed facilities can be stored safely either onsite. or off-site until disposed of ultimately.
Because any program for handling and storage of spent fuel
must result ultimately in the safe and environmentally acceptable disposal of radioactive waste, the Department, in its initial
statement, first discussed the issue of ultimate disposal. The discussion addressed the technical basis upon which a determination can be made that nuclear waste from licensed facilities can
be disposed of safely. The Department described its focus on the
use of mined geologic repositories" and issues that require resolution prior to the successful disposal of nuclear wastes. Also
discussed was the plan, including environmental reviews under
the National Environmental Policy Act,55 that will lead to the
actual construction of disposal facilities. The Department did
not attempt to prove that safe disposal of these radioactive

wastes, with the required approval of the appropriate regulatory
authorities, can be achieved today. Rather, it was shown that
disposal can be achieved within reasonable, specified times upon
completion of DOE's current research development and site exploration programs.
Almost no technical uncertainties exist concerning safe and
environmentally acceptable interim storage, which is primarily a
responsibility of the electric utilities and which typically involves the use of water basins.56 Some technical uncertainties re54. DOE's focus on deep geologic disposal was characterized at that time as an interim strategy pending completion of appropriate environmental reviews. See U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIALLY
GENERATED RADIOACTIVE WASTE (October 1980). In April 1981, the Department, after

considering the benefits, impacts, and costs of reasonable alternatives, decided to adopt a
programmatic strategy to develop mined geologic repositories for disposal of commercially generated high-level waste, while continuing to examine subseabed and very deephole disposal as potential back-up technologies. See 46 Fed. Reg. 26677 (1981).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
56. Water basin, or water pool, storage consists of storing spent nuclear fuel in racks
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main, however, in the disposal program.57 These uncertainties
are accounted for by providing features in the deep geologic disposal program that lead to a relative insensitivity to uncertainties. This is achieved through the application of appropriate site
suitability criteria to diverse geologic environments; the provision of redundant, independent, natural, and engineered features to retard the movement of radionuclides; and the application of conservative engineering practices. Uncertainties, the
Department noted, can be evaluated by considering the bounds
of their worst potential impacts on performance of the entire
disposal system.
By applying a conservative, step-by-step approach in the
program, experience and information gained at each step will
contribute to a reduction in uncertainties and provide a basis for
proceeding to the next step. Even after the research and development is completed, however, residual uncertainties, smaller
than those that now exist, will still remain. The Department's
program and the ability to provide engineered barriers in a disposal system afford sufficient flexibility to accomodate these
residual uncertainties in systems for the safe storage and permanent disposal of radioactive waste.
To demonstrate the Department of Energy's ability to understand and address the social, political, and institutional
aspects of waste management, the Department presented its
program plans and management structures. It also provided a
description of both current and planned institutional arrangements that have been or will be established to enable the nation
to address radioactive waste management problems in a manner
that promotes cooperative relationships between the federal and
state governments.
Recognition of the vital importance of the management of
radioactive wastes in the last several years has caused a significant growth in the Department's program. This growth has required the establishment of a broadly based management strucgenerally positioned at the base of a pool of water. The water serves as a transfer agent

to remove heat from the stored fuel and also provides radiation shielding. DOE STATEMENT OF POSITION, supra note 19, at IV-7.
57. Geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste involves prediction of geologic
and waste behavior over thousands of years. Without actual experience, a certain level of

uncertainty enters into any predictions of such behavior.
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ture in the areas of both research and development and
institutional arrangements. The technical basis for the program
has been substantially broadened. Additionally, scientific disciplines have been recognized as important and investigators from
these fields are now active in the program. The examination of
potentially suitable disposal sites has been expanded to encompass a variety of environments with diverse rock types. Extensive site selection work currently is being carried out in a number of different locations around the United States and work on
new regions is to begin shortly. The bases for decisions are now
being established both internally by the Department of Energy
and externally by the responsible regulatory authorities, namely,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission"s and the Environmental
Protection Agency.59 The development of specific criteria and
standards against which to measure the progress of the technical
program and toward which responsible technical participants in
the program can focus their efforts will provide additional impetus to the successful completion of the required technical work.
Finally, use of a conservative approach will ensure that any
technical uncertainties that might remain will not diminish confidence in the successful operation of storage and disposal facilities that meet the required standards set forth by independent
regulatory authorities.
The expansion of the current waste disposal program is
based on work conducted for more than twenty years. Investiga-

tion of geologic disposal as a means to provide safe isolation of
radioactive wastes has been under way since 1957 when the initial recommendation that such disposal should be considered as
a primary candidate was made by a committee. of the National
Academy of Sciences."0 Although many of these prior investigations may not have been structured strictly within the format
now prescribed for the DOE program, the preliminary work has
been essential in understanding the most important considerations and in guiding the future direction of the program. The
results of the prior investigations now are being integrated into
58. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 13971 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 31393 (1980).
69. See 43 Fed. Reg. 53262 (1978).
60. See COMMITrEE ON WASTE DISPOSAL OF THE DIVISION OF EARTH SCIENCES,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND (NASNRC [National Research Council) Pub. No. 519, 1957).
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the broader DOE program.
The Department showed that implementation of the waste
disposal strategy will result in the establishment of operating geologic repositories in the time range of 1997 to 2006. The exact
date of operation depends upon a number of variables that will
be determined only by the outcome of existing programs. If the
examination of potential repository sites in a variety of geologic
environments with diverse rock types indicates that a site in
bedded or dome salt is preferred for the initial repository, the
reduced construction time possible in salt and an assumption of
licensing schedules recently forecast by the NRC staff 1 could
lead to the operation of a repository as early as 1997. On the
other hand, if further examination indicates that a repository in
hard rock, such as granite, would be preferable, construction in
that medium would require more time before the operation of a
repository could begin. Allowances for other uncertainties, such
as the time required for licensing proceedings or for collection of
more extensive preliminary data than currently planned prior to
the licensing proceedings, could result in initial repository operation as late as 2006.2
The Department of Energy concluded that the waste disposal program described in its statement provides the basis for a
finding that spent nuclear fuel from licensed facilities will be
disposed of safely within a reasonable time. While there is no
technical reason that storage at reactor sites cannot be continued for extended periods of time, shortage of storage capacity
will require additional storage facilities. The technical basis for
construction of additional storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel

61. The NRC staff indicated in a meeting with DOE representatives on October 4,
1979, that the staff estimates 48 months for review of a construction authorization application. DOE STATEMENT OF POSITION, supra note 19, at 111-35.
62. The Department recently has announced that the National Waste Terminal
Storage Program has reached a point that detailed evaluations of a limited number of
potential locations can be accelerated. The NRC has promulgated procedural licensing
regulations requiring exploratory shafts to be sunk to allow underground investigation of
sites prior to their consideration for licensing. 46 Fed. Reg. 13971 (1981). By focusing its
attention on sites most likely to be qualified, the Department intends to be able to sink
exploratory shafts at three possible sites within the next few years. Evaluation of these
sites will allow the designation of one site at which an unlicensed testing and evaluation
facility can be constructed with a capability to accept several hundred packages of radioactive materials. This testing and evaluation disposal facility will be used to gain experience in waste emplacement and information for final decisions to construct full-scale
licensed repositories within the range of time set forth in DOE's Statement of Position.
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and capability to provide such facilities are available now. The
Department of Energy, therefore, concluded that spent nuclear
fuel from licensed facilities can be both stored and disposed of
safely off-site.
The remainder of this Article will describe the Department's principal comments on disposal. It also will discuss some
of the arguments presented by other participants and indicate
how these were answered by the Department in its crossstatement.
III.

ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF ULTIMATE

DisPosAL

As noted above, DOE, in its initial statement, first discussed
disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel. The discussion of disposal
was presented first because the requirements for spent fuel storage are related directly to the availability and capacity of disposal facilities. The amount of spent fuel that can be disposed of
and the schedule for disposal will affect the storage requirements. After discussion of disposal, storage was reviewed. Finally, the initial statement addressed the integration of the disposal system and the storage system and provided examples of
how the two systems relate to each other.
A.

Technical Objectives for Disposal

The goal of safe disposal is the effective isolation of radionuclides from the environment in a safe and environmentally
acceptable manner. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will
judge the adequacy of any high-level waste disposal system by
predetermined criteria. Although the Department is using conservative criteria and methods, there is a recognized need to ensure that the Department's approach will be compatible with
that required by the Commission and be amenable to timely
Commission review. Because final NRC technical regulations are
not yet available,6 3 the Department has developed proposed generic performance objectives, based upon a review of a wide variety of publications on the subject. The Department suggested
that these objectives will be similar to those that the Commission can be expected to promulgate and that they should be
63. The NRC has given notice of a proposed rulemaking to develop technical criteria for regulating geologic disposal of nuclear waste. See 45 Fed. Reg. 31393 (1980).
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used in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking to evaluate the DOE
program. The generic performance objectives that DOE proposed should be met by any disposal system were summarized as
follows:
1. Containment" should be virtually complete during the
period dominated by fission product decay.
2. Isolation" from the accessible environment should be
effective for at least 10,000 years, and reasonably foreseeable
events should not produce consequences greater than normal
variation in background radiation.
3. The operational phase of a waste disposal system should
be as safe as for presently licensed nuclear fuel-cycle facilities.
4. Environmental impacts should be mitigated to the
extent reasonably achievable.
5. Conservative design 6 and evaluation should be applied
to waste disposal systems to compensate for any residual
uncertainties.
6. Acceptable performance should be based on methods
reasonably available and should not depend upon continued
maintenance or surveillance for unreasonable times into the
future.
7. Concepts selected for implementation should be independent of nuclear industry trends (such as its future size or
resolution of specific fuel cycle and design issues) and be compatible with national policies.
To implement the seven objectives for any of the alternative
disposal methods, the Department has adopted a requirement
for conservatism in design and operation. This requirement is
satisfied by (1) continual reassessment of the state of knowledge
to assure, step-by-step, that designs and plans are supported by
the best and latest data; (2) use of multiple barriers to isolate
waste from the biosphere by a series of relatively independent
and diverse barriers that would not be subject to common fail64. "Containment" means confining the radioactive wastes within prescribed boundSTATEMENT OF POSITION, supra note 19,
at 1-15.
65. "Isolation" means segregating waste from the biosphere to the extent required
to meet applicable radiological performance objectives. Id.
66. In this context, conservatism means taking a course of action in design, analysis,
or operation that would tend to overestimate adverse consequences, underestimate mitigating factors, or otherwise provide large margins of safety against undesirable outcomes.
Id. at 11-21.

aries, such as within a waste package. See DOE
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ure; and (3) use of design and operating margins to compensate
for uncertainties in design and knowledge of natural systems.
Several participants challenged the Department's position
concerning the times required for waste "containment" and "isolation." The underlying thrusts of their allegations were that the
Department's proposed objectives do not coincide with draft
NRC technical criteria, 7 the Department's numerical objectives
are without basis, and postulated long-term releases warrant
longer periods of control. After further elaborating on the basis
for its proposed containment and isolation objectives, the Department in its cross-statement showed that its containment objective is consistent with the intent of NRC staff criteria, and
that some participants' assertions that the required isolation period should be longer do not properly consider the hazard that
the waste actually will represent over this longer time period.
The periods of concern are much shorter than some have
suggested. When spent fuel first is placed in a repository its radioactivity content, and therefore its toxicity, will be at its highest point while in the repository. However, the radioactivity of
spent fuel will diminish significantly within the first several hundred years, primarily because of the decay of fission products.
(This is the so-called period "dominated by fission product decay.") During this period, the wastes should be "contained"
tightly within the package in which they were placed because
they then pose their greatest threat to public health and safety
due to the greater thermal driving forces and radiotoxicity. After
this period, the radioactive elements will be significantly reduced in activity and be more nearly like natural elements found
in the earth today. At that time, they become of less concern
because the risk to the general public associated with the wastes
will be very small and, in fact, similar to risks associated with
elements that already have existed in concentrated ore bodies
for all the years people have lived on Earth. Nevertheless, the
Department acknowledged that, because they could pose some
threat to public health and safety, the wastes should be
"isolated."
A number of participants contended that the Department's
disposal program places undue reliance on scientific break-

67. See 45 Fed. Reg. 31393 (1980).
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throughs and ongoing research. They based their presentations
largely on quotations from various documents that identified
claimed research needs and technical uncertainties. The Department had demonstrated, however, that scientific breakthroughs
are not required to successfully implement geologic disposal;
that, because of the existing depth of technical knowledge, program diversity, and flexibility, undue reliance is not placed on
research efforts; and that the program's conservative approach
will, in fact, lead to the safe disposal of radioactive waste despite
residual uncertainties that always will remain. The Department's position is strongly supported by several other participants in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking and by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management., 8
Arguments to the contrary are based on incorrect interpretations
or misunderstandings of the Department's conservative
approach.
B. Disposal Alternatives
A number of disposal alternatives' were outlined in the
DOE statement. The use of mined geologic repositories, however, has since been adopted as a programmatic strategy, following completion of environmental reviews conducted by the Department. Prior to the completion of these environmental
reviews, no decision or commitments that would foreclose alternatives could be made, but geologic repositories were said to appear most likely to meet all of the proposed performance objectives. It is believed that locations within the Earth's crust where
significant change requires geologic time periods to occur and
which appear to provide negligible hydrologic transport potential"O are suitable for the permanent isolation of nuclear waste.
68. See

INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, REPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT (1979).
69. The alternative disposal technologies discussed by DOE are: (1) mined geologic
disposal; (2) subseabed disposal; (3) very deep hole disposal; (4) rock melting disposal;
(5) island disposal; (6) ice sheet disposal; (7) deep well injection disposal; (8) space disposal; (9) waste partitioning and transmutation; (10) chemical resynthesis. DOE STATEMENT OF POsrIoN, supra note 19, at H-27 to -42. These alternatives are discussed in

more detail in U.S.

DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MAN-

AGEMENT OF COMMERCIALLY GENERATED RADIOACTIVE WASTE (Oct.

1980). See note 54

supra.
70. DOE STATEMENT OF POSrION, supra note 19, at 11-28.
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The alternatives of subseabed disposal or disposal in very deep
holes appear more amenable to being assessed with reasonably
available methods (objective 6), and the Department said that
these alternatives appear sufficiently promising to warrant
continued examination to assess their potential for later
development.
C.

Natural and Man-Made Systems of Mined Geologic
Disposal

The mined geologic disposal system, as described by the Department, will incorporate both natural and man-made systems
which are composed of three major subsystems: the natural system associated with the site, the waste package, and the repository. Together they will provide multiple barriers between the
emplaced waste and the human environment. The natural system-the natural geologic and hydrologic features of the repository site, as well as the remoteness of the repository (in terms of
depth below the surface and distance from water supplies)-will
provide barriers for isolating nuclear waste from people and
their environment. Engineered barriers incorporated in the
waste package and repository system will provide containment
of the waste, delaying the time and retarding the rate of release
of radionuclides into the far-field environment.
1. The Natural System.-The natural system for waste
isolation consists of the repository host rock, surrounding geologic formations, and the associated hydrologic environment. It
is discussed in the context of a "near field" and a "far field."
The near field provides both containment and isolation for the
emplaced waste: containment by minimizing the likelihood that
circulating ground water will contact the waste package, and isolation by ensuring that any migration of radionuclides will be
very slow. The prime function of the far field is to ensure that, if
radionuclides were released from the near field, ensuing migration to the biosphere would be of sufficient duration to satisfy
the second generic performance objective of isolation for at least
10,000 years. 1
A six-point summary by DOE of natural systems investigations shows that currently (1) the scope of technical information
71. See text accompanying note 65, supra.
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required for evaluating natural systems and the role that natural
systems can play in providing barriers for containment and iso-

lation are known; (2) required characterization techniques are
available and many represent the state of the art; (3) the need
for additional improvement in predicting performance of fractured, and perhaps water-bearing, rock masses has been recognized; (4) site identification programs, some well-advanced, are
being conducted in a number of regions and with a number of
host rocks, including basalt, granite, salt, and tuff; (5) investigations to date strongly suggest that acceptable natural systems
exist that will meet the performance objectives; and (6) the diversity of media under evaluation, the large number of potentially suitable sites contained in the areas and regions being
studied, and the ability to successfully screen for sites using criteria and the available performance assessment techniques will
result in identifying, qualifying, and licensing repository sites.
2. The Man-Made Systems.-The man-made systems are
made up of three basic functional components: the waste-package system, the repository system, and human-intrusion barriers.
The waste-package system includes everything man places
in the repository waste emplacement hole, including the waste
form, canister, overpack, and backfill. These various package
system components will be used to reduce overall technical uncertainties by virtue of their conservative engineering design and
by providing barriers in addition to those provided by the host
rock and surrounding strata.
Several participants asserted that the interactions of wastes
and potential host rocks are not sufficiently understood to reach
a finding of confidence. There is, however, a large body of information already in the record on thermal and radiation effects on
various geologic media and on waste package interactions to
counter this suggestion. Contrary to many assertions, data on
the performance of spent fuel in geologic environments is being
developed. There are, in fact, many bodies of data pertinent to
the performance of waste package components, such as canister
materials and backfill materials, under repository conditions.
The Department submitted that sufficient information is available to recognize the benefits of engineered barriers and to acknowledge their feasibility. Moreover, other participants' assertions that knowledge of waste package performance is
inadequate did not consider waste package and repository design
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alternatives that can be tailored to provide a conservatively
designed system that will incorporate the natural features of a
specific site. They also failed to recognize here, as elsewhere in
their arguments, that the impact of many individual processes
that might affect waste packages can be conservatively accounted for in assessments of system performance and through
the use of design and operating margins.
Extensive testing and development studies have been conducted for several years on the waste package and specific components of the package. While acknowledging these studies are
not complete, the Department has said that results to date indicate that the waste packages can be designed and fabricated to
provide virtually complete containment of the wastes during the
period dominated by fission product decay. 2
The repository system provides for the receipt, inspection,
transfer to the underground emplacement, and containment after closure of radioactive waste. The system also must contribute
to the long-term isolation of the waste by limiting adverse impacts on the natural isolation system during development of the
repository, and to the extent possible, by enhancing isolation
through the use of engineered barriers. Thus, activities involving
(1) the introduction of heat and radiation generated by the
waste, (2) the excavation of underground disposal areas, and (3)
the introduction of exploration boreholes and shafts, will be conducted to minimize any adverse impact on the integrity of this
natural isolation system. Thermal impacts will be minimized by
limiting the thermal loading, or the concentration of thermal energy per unit of repository space, and thus the temperatures in
the repository. Migration of radionuclides will be restricted by
the use of sorptive backfill materials. Impacts of repository excavation on structural stability will be limited by using low extraction ratios, highly developed and widely applied excavation techniques, and the backfilling of rooms and tunnels.
Human intrusion barriers, the third component of manmade systems, are provided so that the waste will be unaffected
by future activities of man. These barriers are intended to meet
two objectives: reduction of the likelihood of human-induced releases and mitigation of the consequences if human-induced re72. DOE

STATEMENT OF PosrriON,

supra note 19, at 1-17. See text accompanying

note 64, supra.
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leases occur. Although work is just beginning in this area and
there is much to be learned, DOE indicated that it is reasonable
to conclude that the likelihood of future human activities of a
nature that could adversely affect the integrity of the repository
can be reduced to an acceptably low probability through the use
of appropriate protective measures. The impact of any such future activities, were they to occur, could be adequately mitigated
by the multiple natural and man-made barriers included in
waste disposal systems.
D. Assessing Safety Performance
Consideration of mined geologic repositories as a disposal
method requires an examination of the methods of safety analysis in use and to be used to determine whether requirements can
be expected to be met by repository components. As indicated
by DOE, this involves assessing performance both in the longterm and during the period the repository is in operation.
1. Long-Term Performance.-Performance assessment
methods have been developed to analyze the disposal system after the waste has been emplaced and the repository has been
sealed. These methods analyze the combined effects of several
phenomena that might affect the disposal system: natural events
and processes, human actions, and impacts exerted by the waste
and the repository.
Several participants asserted that methods for assessing the
long-term performance of mined geologic disposal systems are
inadequately developed to establish confidence.73 They appeared
to believe that no assessments can be made unless all details of
every process can be accounted for and that every physical and
chemical phenomenon must be completely understood, regardless of its significance. The Department asserted, as did several
other participants, that scientists, in fact, can apply scientific
judgment and analytical techniques to identify those phenomena
that are truly significant; by using conservative values of input
data, scientists can establish an upper bound on the effects of
phenomena not completely understood.
Major contentions raised by participants relative to reposi73. See, e.g., Sheldon, Nuclear Waste: The Problem Remains Unburied, 32 S.C.L.
REv. 911, 919 (1981).
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tory performance were that thermal effects are not adequately
understood; borehole, shaft, and backfill technology is not adequately developed; retrieval is not properly addressed and may
not be possible in some media; abandoned sites may not be adequately restored; post-closure monitoring is not adequately
addressed; and potential human intrusion may disqualify many
geologic disposal sites. Many such allegations do not account for
technical progress in recent years, ignore much of the information previously set forth in the Department's initial statement,
and misinterpret technical documents that the participants
themselves had referenced. Since the mid-1950's many geologic
and environmental studies have been conducted to provide the
technical and scientific basis for the design, construction, and
operation of deep, underground repositories for radioactive
wastes.7 4 A broad spectrum of agencies and organizations has
sponsored this research. Results indicate that a mined geologic
repository can be built and operated safely with minimal effects
on people and their environment.
Several participants asserted that the geosciences are not
sufficiently advanced to identify an acceptable rock medium or
specific site for mined geologic disposal.7 5 To counter these assertions, the Department described the opinions of many eminent scientific peer review groups, the body of information on
geologic exploration techniques, the Department's research on
waste/rock interactions, the very stability and integrity of many
geologic formations, and the methods and associated results
from assessments performed in concert with the siting process.
Geologic processes were shown to lend themselves to scientific
evaluation. The Department noted that since it is possible to
bound the effects of potential phenomena over long periods of
time, perfect knowledge of every process is not required to make
decisions about site suitability. Further, contentions regarding
the viability of each of the media under current investigation
ignore existing information and focus instead on minor resolvable issues. Sweeping generalizations about the unacceptability
of a specific rock medium were shown not to be based on substantive information.

74. See studies and papers cited throughout DOE STATEMENT OF POSITION, supra
note 19, Part II (April 15, 1980).
75. See, e.g., Sheldon, supra note 73, at 921-24.
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Because the disposal system contains components that have
complex interactions with one another and because its performance for long periods must be predicted, the Department recognized the necessity of using mathematical models to analyze the
system. 6 Laboratory, bench-scale, and in situ tests are underway or planned to assist in verifying modeling predictions. Suggestions by some participants that required technology is not
well-advanced were answered by pointing out the available of
many working, sophisticated models.
The use of these continually improving computer models,
along with the continually improving body of experimental data,
will permit the performance assessments to be done more completely and with increased confidence. These assessments will be
important in site selection, system design, and licensing. The
models have been used to assess the performance of disposal
systems and have demonstrated that they can analyze the important phenomena. Because the development and verification
of models and the gathering of data describing sites are incomplete, these assessments have used conservative data derived
from laboratory and field measurements. They have demonstrated that the models have been developed sufficiently for use
with complex systems. These studies also have predicted the
consequences of releases of radionuclides from repositories far in
the future. The vast majority of possible disposal-system conditions would not deliver any measurable doses to people.77 Some
possible but unlikely phenomena, such as ground water flow directly through repositories, could deliver radiation doses that
would be a fraction of the doses delivered by natural background
radiation. The analyses performed to date give no indication

76. The Department described how those computer models are developed, verified,
and applied to gain confidence that the long-term performance of the disposal system
will be acceptable. The development and verification of models of single phenomena required for analyzing the long-term performance of geologic disposal systems are well ad•vanced, and these models can now be routinely used. Even so, the Department noted
that the development and particularly the verification are continuing. The development
and verification of models that analyze several phenomena together are moderately advanced, and some of these models can now be routinely applied.
77. The use in current analytical models of extremely conservative assumptions for
leach rates, radionuclide sorption, modes and rates of radionuclide migrations, and
probability determinations of geologic events has indicated that mined geologic disposal
will limit consequences to levels that will be acceptable in terms of both human impact
and environmental consequence.
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that a geologic disposal system, designed and constructed according to the requirements described by the Department, cannot safely isolate radioactive waste.
2. Operational Phase Performance.-Assessing the performance of the repository during the operational phase does
not require the special methods of long-term performance assessment, because the operations are at least similar to those in
other common systems now in use. For example, the Department pointed out that excavation of storage rooms and packing
and handling of waste containers are not too different from operations currently being performed. Adequate methods required
for safety analyses are currently available. Satisfactory design,
construction, and operation can be achieved. The operational
phase activities can be shown to be comparable in safety to
those of existing, licensed nuclear fuel-cycle facilities.
E. Overall Feasibility and Effectiveness of Mined Geologic
Disposal
The Department has submitted that a mined geologic disposal system can meet the goal of providing the effective isolation
of radionuclides from the environment. Some general observations with respect to various participants' assertions reinforce
DOE's position. As the Department noted in its cross-statement,
the participants raised no new technical issues. Each of the issues raised was addressed in the Department's statement of position or is being addressed by current research. Also, many of
the allegations were either irrelevant or did not recognize the
extensive body of work that has been undertaken over the last
several years. Finally, many of the participants emphasized the
unknown, without explaining why they believed these uncertainties to be of particular significance.
On the other hand, DOE and some other participants provided ample evidence that, through ongoing research and the
use of a conservative approach, residual uncertainties and gaps
in knowledge can be accounted for. In addition, the significance
of any uncertainties with respect to specific barriers will be limited because of the fact that no one barrier is critical to isolation
or containment. Furthermore, DOE's conclusions with respect to
overall feasibility did not rely on scientific breakthroughs or
place undue reliance on the outcome of any of its research and
development programs. The Department laid out comprehensive
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proposed performance objectives78 by which a waste management system can be judged and asserted that compliance with
those objectives, coupled with the diversity and flexibility inherent in its program, provides confidence that all relevant regulatory and statutory requirements will be met.
The Department also noted agreement on the issue of overall technical feasibility by at least one participant that nonetheless challenged the DOE's summary position.79 The Natural Resources Defense Council stated in its statement of position:
The simple question of whether wdstes "can" be disposed of
safely is not at issue. No informed commentator has claimed
that it is now and will continue to be impossible to isolate or
contain high-level radioactive wastes. No laws of physics must
be violated to produce a waste disposal program. Theoretically,
therefore, waste containment and isolation are feasible. The
demand placed on DOE and the NRC is not to show that isolation can be achieved, but that it both can and will be achieved,
within the requisite time period. 0
In short, the Department asserted that the Commission
should dismiss as an issue the question of whether there now
exists a sufficient scientific and technical basis for developing
safe, environmentally acceptable facilities for waste disposal. Evidence to support the conclusion that an ample basis does exist
was provided in the Department's submissions and was backed
by the statements and cross-statements of many other participants.8 1 No technical basis has been shown for altering the De78. See text accompanying and following notes 64-66, supra.
79. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CROSS-STATEMENT ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE at IH-12 (Sept. 5, 1980)(hereinafter cited as

DOE CROSS-STATEMENT).
80. N.R.D.C STATEMENT
81. See, e.g.,

OF POSITION,

supra note 45, at 9 (emphasis in original).

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, STATEMENT OF POSrION

ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (June 23,
1980); AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING
ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (July 3, 1980); ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING GEOLOGISTS, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE

AN) DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (Aug. 1, 1980); ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR
WASTE (July 7, 1980); GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, STATEMENT OF POSmON ON PROPOSED
RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (July 1, 1980); NEIGH-

BORS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, STATEMENT OF POSmON ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (July 4, 1980); U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF Nu-
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partment's conclusions that safe, environmentally acceptable
disposal facilities will be available when needed.
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION OF

DOE's PROGRAM FOR ESTABLISHING

MINED GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES

Many participants in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking
contend that, even putting technical problems aside, the NRC
should not find "confidence" in DOE's schedules for its waste
management program because of unresolved issues of program
implementation, sometimes referred to as "nontechnical" or "institutional" issues.8 2 The Department agreed that the resolution
of difficult nontechnical problems is essential to the success of
its program and maintained that adequate activities are now
under way to permit completion of the schedules described in
83
the DOE submissions in the proceeding.
The Department's waste disposal program focuses on developing repositories that will be available in an appropriate time

frame and at a reasonable cost.8" To accomplish this goal, the
Department has put into place a management organization to
address and resolve the technological, societal, economic, regula-

CLEAR WASTE (July 7, 1980); UTILITY NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT GROUP-EDISON ELEC-

TRIC INSTITUTE, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND
DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (July 7, 1980). Aside from the general issue just discussed,
some participants also questioned whether these technical issues can be resolved to the
extent necessary within the estimated time frames. The Department discussed this in its
statement of position and cross-statement by listing technology development activities to
support the waste package, repository engineering, and site selection. None of the participants challenged these specific milestones. Rather, their positions appeared to be general judgments that certain technical issues or uncertainties will not be sufficiently resolved or narrowed in time to support the Department's schedules.
82. See, e.g., Sheldon, supra note 73, at 930-32.
83. The thrust of the position statements of some participants is that the NRC
should concentrate its inquiry on whether disposal will be accomplished as opposed to
whether it can be. See, e.g., MARVIN 1. LEWIS, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED
RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE at 2 (July 10, 1980);
NRDC STATEMENT OF POSITION, supra note 45, at 9-10 (July 7, 1980); STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL
OF NUCLEAR WASTE at 4 (July 8, 1980); STATE OF NEw YORK, STATEMENT OF POSITION,
supra note 37, at 15-17 (July 7, 1980). DOE specifically has submitted that its state-

ments in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking demonstrate that (1) the techniques proposed to be used for disposal and storage will be safe and (2) they will be implemented

in a time frame that is responsive to national needs. See DOE CROSS-STATEMENT, supra
note 79, at 1-9; text accompanying notes 79-81, supra.
84. See DOE STATEMENT OF POSITION, supra note 19, at HI-1.
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tory, and institutional factors that could have impacts on the
timing and cost of ultimate disposal. The Department outlined
the effective organization it has established consisting of headquarters and field office personnel supported by more than 2000
professional employees of contractors. This arrangement reflects
valuable lessons learned from the past and brings experience
from a broad spectrum of professionals, ranging from geoscientists and mechanical engineers to sociologists and political
scientists.
A.

Site Selection, Licensing, and Environmental
Considerations

The schedule for the development of the first full-scale licensed repository depends on site selection with state consultation and concurrence and licensing for construction. These decisions are the focus of technical activities that must be conducted
in cooperation with those agencies, organizations, and individuals outside of DOE that are part of the decisionmaking process.
The Department is in the process of identifying candidate
sites at several locations and in different geologic media before
recommending a specific site for the first NRC license application. The selection of candidate sites is based on a systematic
process that considers all applicable factors and is conducted
with involvement of state and local officials and the public. The
Department's program leading to selection of a site consists of
three phases: site exploration and characterization, detailed site
characterization, and site selection.
The Department's site selection process is based upon a
continual narrowing of the range of studies within a particular
geologic medium. Initially, studies of a candidate medium are
conducted on a national scale. Then particular regions are identified for further study. From the regional studies, candidate
areas of up to 1000 square miles are identified. These areas are
narrowed to locations, and from the locations acceptable sites
will be selected.
The Department described the regional and area characterizations now under way for various geologic media, including
dome salt and bedded salt, basalt flows, and volcanic tuff. Efforts have been initiated to identify regions containing other media and other geohydrologic systems. The Department indicated
it plans to identify multiple sites with diverse rock types in the
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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next few years. 85 The DOE approach includes consideration of
regulatory factors, environmental factors, the necessity of
achieving public acceptance, and the need to meet site qualification criteria.
After site selection, the second major decision that can affect the repository schedule is licensing. The NRC has the statutory authority to license facilities used primarily for the receipt
and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.88 Accordingly, the availability of regulatory procedures and requirements
can have an impact on the schedule for a disposal system.
Before a license application is submitted, the Department expects to consult with the NRC staff about field exploration activities so that the integrity of a potential site is not adversely
affected.
Existing knowledge of licensing requirements as obtained
from draft and proposed rules and communication with regulatory agencies has allowed the Department to make a forecast of
the effects licensing activities will have on the schedule. Based
on the existing information, estimates were made of the amount
of time that will be required for licensing. The current lack of
final regulatory standards for disposal was shown not to cause
significant delay in the program by those participants that attempted to make such a delay an issue in the Waste Confidence
Rulemaking. The Department's program of research and development is sufficiently broad-based and conservative to encompass the requirements of evolving disposal criteria. The Department demonstrated that its proposed performance objectives for
disposal87 will not be inconsistent with any standards promulgated by the Commission or by the Environmental Protection
Agency. (Regulatory standards for storage, on the other hand,
already are in place."8 ).
Environmental considerations also may influence the schedule of repository construction. The National Environmental Policy Act,89 as implemented by the regulations of the Council on
85. See note 62, supra.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 5842(3) (1976).
87. See text accompanying and following notes 64-66, supra.

88. See note 50, supra.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. I 1976, Supp. II 1978, Supp. III 1979).
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Environmental Quality (CEQ) ° and the DOE guidelines,"1 requires that potential environmental consequences be considered
in Department planning and decisionmaking. Using the DOE
guidelines and the CEQ regulations, the Department developed
a draft NEPA implementation plan for mined geologic disposal,
which is part of the overall Department planning and decisionmaking process. The Department said the environmental impact
of all reasonable alternatives will be considered at each stage of
the decisionmaking process.
1. Coordination of federal activities.-In its role as lead
agency for the management and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes, the Department noted in its initial statement that
it also is preparing, with cooperation of other cognizant federal
agencies, a detailed national plan for nuclear waste management.
It includes many activities specifically recommended by the
Interagency Review Group on Radioactive Waste Management
so that other agencies will give support to the Department activities when it is required. The ability to draw on the resources of
these organizations and to obtain meaningful assistance will
greatly enhance the ability of the Department to meet major
milestones. Some participants, nevertheless, questioned whether
adequate cooperation can be achieved among all the levels of the
federal government, particularly whether the federal government
will be able to pass necessary legislation, provide adequate funding, and coordinate activities of the various agencies.92
The Department showed in its cross-statement that, in fact,
Congress and the executive branch agree on the ultimate goal of
the waste management program, although specific elements of a
program designed to meet this goal are still under consideration.
The Department emphasized that Congress and the executive
branch are actively addressing the resolution of remaining issues
and that necessary legislation and continued provision of the
program funds will be forthcoming. Furthermore, it was shown
that the current program has been formulated with input from a
broad range of institutions, demonstrating a national resolve to
solve waste problems in a safe and environmentally acceptable
90. 40 C.F.R. part 1500 (1980).

91. 10 C.F.R. part 711 (1979).
92. For a discussion of the issue of intergovernmental coordination for a federal
waste disposal program, see Hart, supra note 26, at 677-717.
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manner and without further delay.
In both its statement of position and cross-statement, the
Department demonstrated that the activities of multiple federal
agencies are being coordinated. Other participants have not substantiated their claims that adequate coordination is not now
taking place or will not in the future.
2. Cooperation of State and Local Governments.-Another
broad set of issues raised by other participants concerned the
ability of the federal government to secure necessary cooperation from state and local governments.9 3 In this connection,
some participants questioned the intent of the federal government to give state and local governments a role in the decisionmaking process, the availability and adequacy of mechanisms to
incorporate state and local views, and the availability and adequacy of conflict resolution mechanisms.
The Department's cross - statement demonstrated that
mechanisms to facilitate ongoing investigative work are in place,
as evidenced by the work that is proceeding at multiple locations
throughout the nation. The Department demonstrated that the
current active participation by Congress, the executive branch,
the State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Management,
and various state governments should be able to define the site
selection process before a specific repository site is proposed.
The Department also demonstrated in its cross-statement that
sufficient time has been allowed for addressing and resolving
concerns that may be raised by state, tribal, and local
governments.
B.

Considerationof Public Support, Scheduling, and Costs

1. Public Concerns.-Additional questions were raised
about the Department's ability to address public concerns and
thus win public confidence so that the waste program may go
forward. 4 Specific concerns included the Department's ability to
address perceptions of risk, mitigate socioeconomic impacts, and
achieve equity in distribution of risks and impacts. The Department maintained that public perceptions of high risk in time

93. The broad issue of federal preemption of state laws regulating nuclear waste
transportation and disposal is discussed at length in Jaksetic, supra note 22, at 801-24.
94. See, e.g., Sheldon, supra note 73, at 930-32.
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will subside to match current scientific understanding and that
public confidence will be gained through DOE's emphasis on
safety, public education by credible public institutions, and the
involvement of state and local officials at all phases of repository
development.
The Department showed that it recognizes the importance
of socioeconomic empacts and that it has instituted a program
to assess them and to provide recommendations to Congress
concerning methods of mitigation. The federal government, it
was pointed out, has dealt successfully with such socioeconomic
impacts at federal installations of similar sizeY5 Furthermore,
considerable time remains to allow the design of specific impact
mitigation measures that might be required for high-level radioactive waste repositories.
Some participants' position statements also questioned the
equity of imposing risks and impacts on people living near a repository or along transportation corridors and asserted that perceived inequities could impede repository siting. The Department recognizes that the equity of the siting of undesirable but
necessary facilities for handling noxious or hazardous materials,
radioactive or otherwise, is a growing concern to modern society.
The Department submitted, however, that methods to deal with
perceived inequities have been successfully applied for many
types of facilities. The resolution of this concern will not require
methods unique to radioactive waste management and will not
lead to delay beyond the considerable time allowed in the Department's schedules.
2. Scheduling.-Another major concern was with the ability
of the Department to meet its schedules. In particular, some
participants questioned whether industry will provide necessary
cooperation, whether adequate time has been allowed, whether
the Department needs to consider more fully the availability of

multiple repositories, and whether the Department adequately
treats costs.
The waste management program is proceeding with the active assistance of industry. The Department believes the industry cooperation will continue. Schedules for disposal, in fact,
provide considerable time for interaction with state and local
95. DOE

CROSS-STATEMENT, supra note 79, at
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governments, for public hearings, and for extended public interactions during both site selection and licensing and development. Finally, the Department maintained that repositories
likely will be located in different regions of the country, that will
not create problems that vary greatly from those of a single repository, and that the current program is structured to accommodate development of as many repositories as are needed.
Where the Department does not already own or control a
proposed repository site, the acquisition of the land for the repository site must be considered in the schedule. Nonfederal
land can be acquired by the Department for a repositbry site by
purchase or condemnation following procedures already established. 6 Federal property controlled by other agencies may be
acquired by transfer to the Department following procedures
established by the General Services Administration9 7 or by the
Department of the Interior.9e
Skilled technical personnel will be required in the site exploration and characterization phase of the program, in the development of necessary technology, and in the design and construction phase of the repository. The design and construction
expertise required to build a geologic repository currently is
available in the United States. Operating expertise will be available by the time the repository is ready for waste emplacement.
The repository development schedule thus should not be affected by the need for lead time to develop any needed
expertise. 90
3. Costs.-DOE has considered all elements of waste management cost. This cost was shown in the Department's cross96. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Notice 4300.1 (February 1979), as extended by U.S.
Dept. of Energy, Notice 1321.77 (February 1980).

97. See 41 C.F.R. 101-47.203 (1980).
98. See 43 C.F.R. part 1600 (1980).

99. Although not strictly associated with the schedule to bring a repository into operation, the waste retrieval period and start of backfill both have an impact upon the
time when a repository can become fully operational. During the initial repository operation period, the Department will verify the predictive capability of methods used to apply early geologic test data to the specific site and design configuration and will verify
that no unforeseen phenomenon associated with actual waste emplacement is observed.
Ample latitude is provided for methodical development including testing and evaluation.
A high level of confidence concerning the integrity of the operation will be attained
before backfilling will commence. Should retrieval of waste be necessary following the
initiation of backfilling, DOE's waste management plans include rerouting the wastes to
other facilities.
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statement to represent a relatively small portion of the cost of
the nation's electricity and is therefore not "prohibitive," thus
satisfying the test the Commission has said it will apply in the
Waste Confidence Rulemaking in considering whether a waste
disposal model is realistically available.1 0 0
C.

Conclusions About Nontechnical Issues

Some of the participants attempted to use the foregoing
"institutional" issues to support a logic for refuting the Department's conclusions. The general pattern used was summarized
by the Department as follows:
1. Such Participants contended that institutional issues are
important. They cited past instances when program activities
have been slowed or halted because of such problems as (i) intergovernmental conflict in the waste program; (ii) State and
local opposition to repository siting; and (iii) public perceptions of exceeding high repository risks.
2. Such Participants contended either (i) that the Department
has not adequately understood and addressed these issues; (ii)
that the Department has no plans for dealing with these issues;
or (iii) that such plans as the Department does have lack substance and specificity.
3. Such participants contended that, at the very least, resolution of these issues will be time-consuming and that the Department has not made appropriate allowances in its schedules.
The Department agreed with other participants who said
that the resolution of difficult nontechnical problems is essential
to the success of the waste program and that in many past instances the federal government has not adequately addressed
these problems. More recent events, however, show a clear recognition of these issues and how progress is being made to address them. This evidence includes the actions of the federal
government to formulate a national policy with broad input
from multiple institutions and the public, the establishment of
the State Planning Council, and numerous examples of joint federal-state discussions and agreements. The Department specifi-

100. See 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 (1979). Regarding assertions that a cost estimate

for the integrated system was needed, DOE noted that the NRC has stated specifically
that this proceeding is not intended to examine a detailed cost estimate. Id. However,
detailed cost estimates are being prepared by DOE.
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cally did not contend that it now has all the answers. Indeed,
further study and consultation with others is an important part
of DOE's plans. It is evident from the information represented
in DOE's statement of position and cross-statement that the results of study and consultation, as well as the Department's own
experiences in working With states, localities, the public, and
other federal agencies, are being successfully incorporated into
the program.
Specific contingency times were set forth in the schedules in
the Department's original position statement, and any specific
contentions about these schedules were refuted in the DOE
cross-statement. Although it is possible that resolution of these
uncertainties will take longer than anticipated, the Department
submitted that its estimates are reasonable. Other participants
did not provide substantive information to support their claims
to the contrary.
DOE recognizes that closer examination is needed to determine whether the alleged lack of specificity or substance in particular institutional plans and mechanisms is a threat to the program's success. For example, the Department indicated it is true
that DOE does not have detailed "institutional" plans to conduct site investigations over the next few years. Nonetheless, it
does have written understandings with several of the states involved, and these investigations are proceeding. Similarly, detailed plans have not been made for reaching siting decisions following the site exploration phases. But for such plans to be
workable, they must be acceptable to the multiple institutions
that must live by them. Accordingly, the Department observed
that the important factor here is that these institutions be participants in their design, which they are. Through the efforts of
the Department, the State Planning Council, individual state
governments, and Congress, consensus on the essential elements
of the process is developing and is likely to be embodied in legislation soon.10 1 It, thus, is appropriate that only a framework for
consultation and concurrence exists at this time.
The Department concluded that perhaps the best assurance
that these issues of program implementation will be resolved in
a timely fashion lies in the will of the American people. It should
101. Legislative developments in the 96th Congress are discussed in detail in Hart,
supra note 26.
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be clear by now from the extensive record of the Waste Confidence Rulemaking, if not this Symposium itself, that American
society views the problem of nuclear waste as a serious piece of
unfinished environmental business that must be resolved without further delay. The Department observed that the public will
hold its institutions accountable for expeditious, good-faith efforts to resolve their differences. Interagency disputes can, if
necessary, be appealed to the President or governors. Intergovernmental disputes will yield either to negotiated resolution or
to powers of law prescribed by the United States Constitution
and exercised by the Congress. In short, the willingness and determination of citizens and voters that progress be made toward
reasonable, equitable, and safe solutions creates confidence that
nontechnical problems can and will be overcome. The Department suggested that, if the Commission publicly expresses confidence in the technical capability to isolate nuclear waste safely,
many of the problems of program implementation stand to be
greatly lessened.
V.

INTEGRATED OPERATION OF THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL

SYsTEMs
The Department lastly considered the integration of the
mined geologic repository and storage programs to demonstrate
that an overall waste management program exists that is capable
of handling, storing, and disposing of the spent fuel. While studies to optimize the integration of the system of federal disposal
and utility storage have not been completed, a sample spent-fuel
management scenario was analyzed. Variables considered included the capacity, receiving capability, and date of availability
of geologic disposal facilities, storage availability and required
capacity, and the transportation logistics for moving spent fuel.
It was shown that the combined system of disposal and storage
facilities will provide great flexibility to meet the need to balance technical conservativism, regional needs, and reactor operation requirements.
Some participants expressed concern about the logistics of
transporting spent fuel, 102 including the possibility that there

102. Transportation safety, as opposed to logistics, was not intended to be within
the scope of the rulemaking proceeding. See note 17, supra.
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will be an insufficient number of casks available to meet transport needs, the dependence on railroads for the bulk of the shipments, and the impact of the large number of shipments on local
communities and receiving facilities. The Department showed
that the requirements for shipping casks will be filled most easily with present casks and a modest program of cask construction readily within existing industrial capability. It also demonstrated that the nation's railroads can meet the program's
transportation needs and that the number of shipments is not
expected to be so large as to have a significant impact in local
communities. The Department submitted that receiving facili-

ties can be designed to accommodate the expected shipments.
In response to some participants' assertions that an integrated safety analysis was required, the Department showed that
both the Department and the Commission, in fact, have conducted safety analyses and environmental .impact analyses on
the storage of spent fuel; the Department and the Commission
have evaluated and reported on the safety aspects of transporting spent fuel, although this topic is outside the scope of this
proceeding; and the Department is preparing a comprehensive
evaluation of safety and environmental considerations related to
disposal. The interactions among these three elements already
have been analyzed at the shipping-receiving "interface,"
thereby providing a complete analysis of each component part of
the system.
VI.

SUGGESTED NRC FINDINGS

Based upon the information in its statement and crossstatement, the Department concluded that the Commission
should find that:
1. Spent nuclear fuel from licensed facilities can be disposed of in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner;
2. The Federal Government's plans for establishing geologic repositories are an effective and reasonable means for

developing a safe and environmentally acceptable disposal
system;
3. Spent nuclear fuel from licensed facilities can be stored

in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner on-site or offsite until disposal facilities are available;
4. Sufficient additional storage capacity for spent nuclear
fuel from licensed facilities will be established; and
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5. The disposal and interim storage systems for spent
nuclear fuel from licensed facilities will be integrated into an
acceptable operating system.

As indicated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 3 the
Commission will use the findings of its Waste Confidence
Rulemaking to determine to what extent issues of on-site storage
of spent nuclear fuel need be considered in individual facility
licensing proceedings. Having made these five findings, DOE
concluded that the Commission should promulgate a rule providing that the safety and environmental implications of spent
nuclear fuel remaining on-site after the anticipated expiration of
the facility licenses involved need not be considered in individual facility licensing proceedings.
VII.

CONCLUSION-WHERE RULEMAKING STANDS TODAY

Following the submission of position statements, crossstatements, and "suggestions as to further proceedings,"1'0 the
NRC staff working group filed its report on January 29, 1981.
The participants then were given an opportunity to submit another round of written comments. In comments filed on March
5, 1981, DOE concluded that the working group report generally

had summarized accurately the voluminous record and identified
adequately the range of issues in controversy in the Waste Con-

103. See 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 (1979).
104. The latter submissions were filed pursuant to the presiding officer's orders that
the participants, by October 6, 1980, file "suggestions as to the nature and scope of further proceedings, additional areas of inquiry or further data or studies." Order, supra,
note 15; Waste Confidence Rulemaking, Order Extending Time to File Statements and
Cross-Statements of Position (May 29, 1980), at 5. In its submission, the Department
said it was evident that, in the period that started in October 1979, the participants had
extraordinary and repeated opportunities to identify, examine, and comment upon issues
related to nuclear waste storage and disposal. The participants had two opportunities to
present their written views on disposal and storage in general and DOE's position in
particular. Further, both the Department and the Commission went to great efforts to
provide to the interested public both information and opportunity to participate in the
Waste Confidence Rulemaking. For example, the Commission agreed to reproduce and
serve the position statements and cross-statements of all participants. The Department
and the Commission made large numbers of documents available at eleven locations
around the country. Every issue that the participants were able to advance was the subject of ample written discussion. Thus, the Department concluded no useful purpose
could be served by ordering that additional time and resources be committed to conducting further studies.
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fidence Rulemaking. 10 5 Further, the Department agreed with the
working group's conclusions that for most, if not all, of the issues identified the existing record of the proceeding was adequate and need not be supplemented. DOE also agreed with the
working group's conclusion that not all issues raised by the participants are equally critical to a finding of "confidence." The
Department submitted, moreover, that the items on which the
report suggested further information was needed fell into the

category of not critical to a finding of "confidence."106
In its suggestions as to further proceedings dated October 6,

1980, the Department of Energy had submitted that its presentation in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking demonstrated the
existence of an overall nuclear waste management program capable of handling, storing, and disposing of spent nuclear fuel from
commercial power reactors. DOE also had said that the proceedings that had been conducted in the rulemaking since October
1979 had produced a comprehensive factual record more than
sufficient to serve as the basis for a final NRC rule. In its com-

105. At the same time, the Department pointed out that the particular format chosen by the NRC working group did not always provide an accurate synopsis of information available in the record. Because the participants did not specifically address the
issues as framed in the working group report, the working group's summaries of "positions" on particular issues had to be developed by referring to apparently related discussions in the various statements of the participants. DOE therefore strongly endorsed the
statement of the working group that the summaries do not serve to substitute for, and
should be used only as guidance to, the detailed record. The working group also failed to
recognize the degree to which DOE's position statement and cross-statement were supported by literally hundreds of technical references (copies of which were submitted for
the record) and to acknowledge the fact that positions taken by participants in their
original statements in many cases were addressed in the various cross-statements submitted by DOE and other participants. In short, DOE urged that the NRC use the working group report only for indexing purposes and not as a substitute for the actual record
developed in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking.
106. The working group report appeared to identify six areas in which it believed
more information might be needed before the Commission closed the record. These were
information about (1) the historical and projected expenditures in terms of manpower
and monetary commitments to DOE's programs, (2) how "a score of geotechnical tests"
are integrated into DOE's program, (3) technical subsurface data on basalt at the Hanford Site (a large federal reservation) in the State of Washington, (4) DOE's specific
plans for retrievability of waste packages emplaced in a repository, (5) the alternative of
indefinite storage of spent fuel, and (6) storage and disposal of severely damaged spent
fuel. The Department indicated it is prepared to offer additional information on these
points as may be required by the NRC, but said it believes that the proceeding should be
brought to an orderly conclusion at the earliest possible time and that the record is adequate to do so now.
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ments of March 5, 1981, the Department concluded that the
NRC staff working group report only reinforced the Department's previous conclusions.
While the working group identified a few points on which it
believed additional information may be "desirable," these points
taken singularly or together are not critical to the Commission's
finding of confidence in the proceeding. The Department has indicated it is prepared to offer additional information on these
points as may be required by the Commission. However, the Department also has said that the Commission can evaluate the
existing record in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking and use it
as the basis for indicating how questions of the disposition of
spent nuclear fuel will be addressed in individual NRC licensing
proceedings. 107

107. In its Memorandum and Order of January 6, 1981, the Commission directed
the presiding officer to submit his recommendations concerning further proceedings in
the Waste Confidence Rulemaking following the close of the comment period on the
working group report. Waste Confidence Rulemaking, Memorandum and Order (January
6, 1981). Therefore, the Department renewed its request of October 6, 1980, that the
participants be given an opportunity to submit written comments on any proposed procedures for further written submissions or oral presentations before the Commission
closes the record in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, COMMENTS ON REPORT OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF WORKING GROUP

(March

5, 1981). More particularly, if it is decided that oral presentations would be appropriate,
the Department reiterated that the Commission should establish strict time limits for
such presentations. This would be most necessary to an orderly proceeding with so many
participants and such a voluminous and complex record. It also would enable the Commission to hear each participant both in an efficient manner and in a time frame consistent with the Commission's dedication to its timely completion of this proceeding. Id.
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